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STATUTORY PROTECTION OF SURETIES AND
COSURETIES
Where D is indebted to 0 and the obligation is past-due and
S has bound himself as surety for D and fears the insolvency or
disappearance of D, what legal responsibility may S impose upon
0 to proceed immediately against D? At common law S could
only protect himself against C and D by a bill quia timet in equity
to compel D to pay and C to collect the debt.' As against D, S
also had the right of exoneration and reimbursement.! The equit-
able remedy, however, was found too cumbersome to be effective
and consequently at an early date sureties demanded statutory
protection. Thus in 1794, Virginia adopted the statute giving S
a remedy at law.2 The statute provided:
"that when any person or persons shall hereafter become
bound as security or securities .... for the payment of money
or tobacco, and shall apprehend that his or their principal
debtor is or are likely to become insolvent .... it shall and
may be lawful for such security .... to require by notice in
writing to his or their creditors, forthwith to put the bond,
bill or note, .... in suit; and unless the creditor or creditors
.... shall in a reasonable time commence an action .... the
creditor or creditors .... shall thereby forfeit the right ....
to demand and receive . . . . the amount of the money or
tobacco which may be due by such bond, bill or note."'
In the general revision of the Virginia Code of 1849 the phrase
"any person bound by any contract" was substituted for the
phrase "any person .... bound as security".' In substantially
23 MINoR's INST. Pt. I, 187; 2 TucKEm's Comm. 481; Wright's Adm'r v.
Stockton, 5 Leigh (Va.) 153, 158, 159 (1834); of. Padwick v. Stanley, 6
Hare 627, 63 Eng. Rep. 664 (1852); Wooldridge v. Morris, L. R. 6 Eq. 409
(1868); Acherson v. Fredegar Dry Dock & Wharf Co., Ltd., L. R. 2 Oh. D.
401 (1909); Morrison v. Banking Chemical Co., Ltd., L. R. (1919) 2 Oh. D.
325.
2See, 3 MINOR'S INST. supra n. 1 at 188.
1 1 REv. CoDE (VA.) e. 116, § 6.
'Cited from Wright's Adm'r v. Stockton, supra n. 1, at 154, n. 1.
'VA. CODE (1849) c. 146, § 4. "The surety or grantor, or endorser, (or
his personal representative) of any person bound by any contract, may, if a
right of action has accrued thereon, require the creditor, or his personal rep-
resentative, by notice in writing, forthwith to institute suit thereon; and if
he be bound in a bond with collateral condition, or for the performance of
some collateral undertaking, he shall also specify in such requisition the
breach of the condition or undertaking for which he requires suit to be
brought."
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in this form the statute has remained.' Eighteen states have
adopted similar provisions,' three states provide the same remedy
by judicial decision,8 and five states have a special type of statute
requiring the creditor to pursue any remedy which he has against
the principal debtor which is not accorded to the surety directly.'
Quaere, do these statutes supplement the common law remedies or
do they supersede them?'2
The statute in its original form gave a remedy to the surety
in case the creditor did not "put the bond, bill or note ..... in
suit" upon notification by the surety that the surety feared for
the solvency or suability of the principal. The revision of 1849
permits the surety to give notice to the creditor "if a right of
action has accrued"'2 and thereupon the creditor must "institute
suit against every part to such contract"." Quacre, does the
elimination of the requirement of insolvency or threatened ab-
sence of the principal debtor in the revision of 1849 extend the
application of the statute to cases in which the surety fears for the
solvency of the cosurety? This question was before the West Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Citizens' National
OVA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 5774. The provision is similar in West Vir-
ginia. See, W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 45, art. 1, § 1.
"ALA. CODE (1928) § 9555; ARIz. REV. CODE (1928) § 3050; STAT. or Aux.
(Crawford, 1921) §§ 8287-8289; GA. ANN. CODE (1926) § 3546; ILL. REV.
STAT. (1929) c. 132, § 1; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§ 1288, 1289; IowA
CODE (1927) H9 9457, 9458; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 4668; MISS. CODE(1930) § 2957; Mo. REV. STAT. (1919) §§ 12687-12692; N. C. CODE (1927)§§3967, 3968; Omo GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 12191-12193; TENN. ANN.
CODE (Shannon, 1918), §§ 3517-3520; COMPLETE TEX. STAT. (1928) §§ 6244,
6248; CODE or VA. (1930) § 5774, 5775; WASH. Comp. STAT. (Remington,
1922) c. 9, 99 974, 975; W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 45, Art. 1, §§ 1, 2;
WvYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. (1920) §§ 6293-6295.8 Pain v. Packard & Munson, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 174 (1815) ; Lickenthaler v.
Thompson, 13 S. & R. (Pa.) 157 (1825); Martin v. Skehan, 2 Colo. 614(1875). See also The Doatrine of Pain v. Packard (1928) 37 YALE L. J.
971, n. 9; L. R. A. 1918C 10; AMES, CASES ON THE LAW or SuRnnsm 221;
CAMPBELL, CASES ON SURETYSHIP 514. N. B. This doctrine was developed
after the enunciation of the Virginia statute of 1794.
°CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1928) §§ 2840, 2845; MONT. REV. CODE (Choate,
1921) §§ 2801, 2803; N. D. Comtf. LAWS ANN. (1913) §§ 6681, 6683; OKLA.
REV. LAWS (1921) §§ 5153, 5155; ComP. LAWS or S. D. (1929) §§ 1504, 1506,
1507.
"ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 9545, "The remedies given sureties and co-
sureties in this chapter are not exclusive of other remedies conferred by
statute or existing at common law, but are cumulative and additional." Bruce
v. Edwards, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 11 (1827); Jackson v. Huey, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 84(1882). But see, Jenkins v. Clarkson, 7 Ohio 72 (1835); Colerick v. MeClear,
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Bank of Philippi." In this case a creditor demanded payment on
a bond and served notice on the principal and sureties that a mo-
tion for judgment would be made. Learning that the motion would
not be made on the specified day, three of the sureties notified the
creditor that if the suit was not brought and any of the other
sureties became insolvent they would not be bound. A year
elapsed and suit was again instituted. The sureties pleaded, and
the lower court sustained, the notice under the statute which pro-
vided that if such suit was not instituted against every party to
the contract the creditor would forfeit his rights against surety
and his cosureties. The court reversed the circuit, holding that
the statute was not intended to give protection to one surety
against another.
The interpretation of a statute is justified only in case the
statute is ambiguous.' But ambiguity in law, as in everything,
is a matter of subjective relativity. If the revision of 1849 is
ambiguous, it is because the statute is in derogation of the common
law, or because of the existence of the statute of 1794, or because
of the revisor's failure to explain the cause of the change. Con-
temporaneous statutes and judicial decisions treat statutes extend-
ing remedies to sureties as supplemental to, rather than in deroga-
tion of, the common law. If this is so the "rule" of strict con-
struction of statutes in derogation of the common law does not
apply, and thus there is no need for a restrictive interpretation.
Does the existence of the statute of 1794 compel a strict con-
struction? Apparently not. If the statute had first been adopted
in its revised form it would be difficult to restrict it to the "sure-
ty-debtor" relation in the face of its general language applying
to "every party to such contract". Mechanically, it is possible
to argue for a restrictive interpretation on the grounds of ambigu-
ity arising either from the existence of the prior statute or from
the silence of the revisors in changing the statute."5
1"171 S. E. 810 (W. Va. 1933).
The requirements of the statute as to notice were satisfied. See, W. VA.
REv. CoDE (1931) e. 45, art. 1, § 1.
20 See, W. VA. Rv. CODE (1931) c. 45, art. 1, § 2.
71 New York v. Gottlieb, 265 U. S. 310, 44 S. Ct. 528 (1924); Kelley &
Moyers v. Bowman, 68 W. Va. 49, 69 S. E. 456 (1910); Eastman v. State,
109 Ind. 278, 10 N. E. 97 (1887). See Horack, In the Name of Legislative
Intention (1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 119, 120.
28 Supra n. 10.
1OAs to the task of interpreting the silence of the 1849 revisors, the age-old
discussion of the interpretation to be attached to the silence of the legislators,
see GENY, MWTHODE D' ENTEaPRETATION, II, No. 172 (2d ed. 1919) p. 162,
(- the law being silent, the difficulty is to be resolved by means of free
3
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If the existence of the prior statute is restrictive, it must be
on the theory that the ejusdem generis rule applies as well to
phraseology in successive enactments as it does to general and par-
ticular phraseology in a single enactment.' This application of
the rule, however, seems contrary to the purpose of the statutory
amendment. In the normal ejusdem generis situation the meaning
is uncertain because of the impossibility of generality and partic-
ularity existing contemporaneously. But an amendment may seek
either (1) to clarify and simplify language without changing its
substance; or (2) to change the effect of the prior enactment.
In the instant case it is not clear so far as reference to the
parties to the transaction are concerned whether the revisors in-
tended a change in the substance of the law or not. Thus no
"genuine interpretation" is possible.' A "spurious interpreta-
tion" will resolve the question. It is said that spurious interpre-
tation exists when the legislators did not have before them the
specific problem which now confronts the court. The process, in
such a case, will be "not so much the searching for the intention
of the legislators as it is the administration of the legislators' rule
by the court, according to a semi-intuitive sense of justice which
will make the abstract rule amenable to the juristic needs of the
community." So in the principal case the court must eventually
decide, no matter how it wishes to mask its decision, whether it
wishes to protect the creditor or the surety against the solvency
or disappearance of cosureties.u
scientific research); L RENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, I, No.
279 (5th ed. 1893) p. 355; CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION A L'ErUDE DU DROIT CIVIL,
Nos. 70, 71 (5th ed. 1929); and see, contra, SCHusTrm, PSiNcPLss or GERmAN
Crvm LAw (1907) § 17.
Practically, the West Virginia court has in fact applied to the silence of
the revisers a spurious restrictive interpretation, through the court's implicit
assumption that the revisors intentionally rejected the protection of the surety
against the cosurety.
mThe ejusdem generis doctrine is a rule of construction only and is not
controlling in all cases. Mason v. United States, 260 U. S. 545, 43 S. Ct. 200
(1923); Gauley Coal Land Co. v. Koontz, 77 W. Va. 583, 87 S. E. 930 (1916).
Even within the same statute general and special matter will not be construed
together unless such is strong legislative intention.
a' 1The object of genuine interpretation is to discover the rule which the law-
maker intended to .establish; to discover the intention with which the law-
maker made the rule, or the sense which he attached to the words wherein the
rule is expressed. Its object is to enable others to derive from the language
used "the same idea which the author intended to convey'." Pound, Spurious
Interpretation (1907) 7 COL. L. REV. 379, 382.
211 ..... the object of spurious interpretation is to make, unmake, or
remake, not merely to discover (the intention of the law-maker). ' Elder,
Statutory Interpretation (1932) 7 TuL. L. REv. 128, n. 14.
Horack, Statutory Interpretation - Light from Plowden's Reports (1931)
19 Ky. L. T. 211, 225.
2"The presence of so many confused, contradictory, and meaningless
4
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The statute, however, is subject to another interpretation;
an interpretation which makes it so distinctively different from the
statute of 1794 that the prior existence of that statute and the
silence of the revisors can create no ambiguity. The statute of
1794 granted a remedy to sureties only in case of the threatened
insolvency or disappearance of the principal debtor. The revision
of 1849, however, removed any requirements concerning the sol-
vency or suability of any party to the contract and extended a new
protection which arose upon the single contingency that the obliga-
tion was overdue.' Consequently, to argue by analogy from the
insolvency of the principal obligor that the revision of 1849 was
not intended to reach situations arising from the insolvency of
parties secondarily liable is erroneous, for by the new statute the
solvency of the principal debtor is as unimportant as is the sol-
vency of the cosurety. The revision of 1849 is in fact a new en-
actment and not a clarification of the existing statute.' The inter-
pretation of the court which limits it to the scope of the prior en-
actment creates more difficulties than it cures. By this interpreta-
tion many new problems are created. For example, will the court
read into the statute the requirements of the prior enactment that
before the surety can be protected from overdue obligations he
must prove the threatened insolvency or disappearance of the
principal debtor?
Problems like these will continue to multiply and judicial de-
cisions will hamper the orderly growth of the law until such time
as common law courts are willing to treat the problem of statutory
interpretation according to modern code technique.
--FEDRICK "W. FORD.
"theories" and "methods" of interpretation creates a turbid atmosphere
which is not conducive to clear thinking. Clarity would manifestly be secured
by singleness and avowed method. If we must select one, it is hard to see
how we can avoid selecting that method which is the commonest in practice,
if the least announced. The statute - the lez 7ata - creates limits on both
sides of strictness and liberality. Within them, any decision to interpret
strictly might with advantage be consciously rendered on the basis of its
probable consequences. Radin, Statittory Interpretation (1929) 43 HArv. L.
REv. 863. For a plea for the legislative intent, see Landis, A Note on
"Statutory Interpretation" (1929) 43 HARv. L. REV. 886.
S upra n. 5.
Alabama copied the Virginia statute of 1794. See CLAY'S DIGEST, 532;
Shahan v. Hampton, 8 Ala. 492, 495 (1846). After the Virginia revision of
1849, Alabama also revised their statute. They specifically included the
cosurety situation, and it is arguable that they did so believing that they
were following the Virginia practice. ALABAMA CODE (1852) § 2647. See
Savage's Adm'r v. Carleton, 33 Ala. 443, 445 (1859). See also ALA. CODE
(Michie, 1928) § 9555.
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